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Abstract
Existing evidence suggests that U.S. Government budget receipts forecasts are unbiased
and eﬃcient. Our study is an attempt to examine the veracity of these findings. The time
series framework employed in this study is distinguished from previous work in three ways.
First, we build a model that explicitly admits serial correlation in the residuals by allowing
for autoregressive, moving-average, serial correlation. Second, we employ the nonparametric
Monte-Carlo bootstrap to free ourselves from reliance on asymptotic distribution theory which
is suspect given the short data series available for this study. Third, we control for errors in
the macroeconomic and financial assumptions used to produce the U.S. Government’s budget
forecasts. We find that the U.S. Government’s annual, one-year ahead, budget receipts forecasts
for fiscal years 1963 through 2003 are biased and ineﬃcient. In addition, we find that these
forecasts exhibit serial correlation in their errors and thus do not eﬃciently exploit all available
information. Finally, we find evidence that is consistent with strategic bias that may reflect the
political goals of the Administration in power.
1 Introduction1
Government revenue forecasts are intended to provide information about the fiscal resources avail-
able to government for some future time period. However, revenue forecasts, like all predictions of
uncertain events, are subject to errors. In fact, the Oﬃce of Management and Budget’s (OMB)
revenue forecasts were overly optimistic throughout much of the 1980s, overly pessimistic during
much of the 1990s, and once again overly optimistic during the first part of the 2000s.2 Since esti-
mates of government revenues are driven by forecasts of uncertain events, this pattern of forecast
errors could be the result of accidental errors. In contrast, some observers contend that the OMB’s
revenue forecasts were deliberately biased during this period to further the policy goals of the ad-
ministration responsible for preparing the federal government’s annual budget. More specifically,
the optimistic forecasts of the 1980s and 2000s coincided with the Reagan and Bush II adminis-
trations and, according to this view, were useful in garnering support for Republican sponsored
increases in defense spending and tax cuts. Likewise, the period of pessimistic forecasts coincided
1We would like to thank Kathleen Bailey, Aparna Krishnamoorthy, and Peter Oburu for outstanding research
assistance. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the views of any
institutions with which the authors are aﬃliated.
2At the federal level, the Oﬃce of Tax Analysis in the Department of Treasury prepares revenue forecasts that the
OMB uses in the development of the president’s budget. The Bureau of the Budget in the Department of Treasury
was reorganized into the OMB in 1970. For ease of reference, we refer throughout this paper to the OMB’s revenue
forecasts and OMB’s revenue forecasting record.
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with the Clinton administration and, again, according to this view, furthered the deficit reduction
agenda of the Democratic party.
Whether accidental or deliberate, forecasting errors compromise the accuracy, reliability, and
trustworthiness of revenue forecasts. Deliberate forecasting errors would be particularly harmful
to the budget process. If, for example, the public is unable to distinguish accidental forecasting
errors from deliberate ones, elected oﬃcials may be able to postpone politically risky decisions to
cut expenditures or raise taxes to address fiscal imbalances and avoid political responsibility for
any resulting growth in budget deficits by attributing ’unexpected’ budget shortfalls to accidental
forecasting errors.3 In short, accurate revenue forecasts play an important role in the budget
process by contributing to transparency in government operations, political accountability, and
fiscal discipline.
Given the importance of accurate revenue forecasts to the budget process, a number of papers
examine the quality of OMB’s short-turn revenue forecasting record. Auerbach (1999) finds that
the OMB’s revenue forecasting errors during the period from FY 1986 through FY 1999 have such
large standard errors that it is diﬃcult to conclude that the forecasts were biased during this period.
Similarly, Plesko (1988), Blackley and DeBoer (1993), and Campbell and Ghysels (1995) find little
evidence of bias in the OMB’s short-run revenue forecasts.4 If these findings are correct, then there
is little reason to believe that the OMB’s revenue forecasting errors are the result of deliberate bias.
Paraphrasing Geweke and Feige (1979), an econometric procedure should be powerful enough to
reject the hypothesis of rationality, and it should provide some indication of why the hypothesis is
not true. The econometric procedures that we propose and employ are more eﬃcient than most
of the traditional techniques that have been used in the study of forecast quality.5 In light of the
importance of accurate revenue forecasts in promoting fiscal discipline and growing concerns about
U.S. federal budget deficits, it seems like an opportune time to re-evaluate the OMB’s revenue
forecasting record, especially now that more data are available. In fact, using nonparametric tests
recommended by Campbell and Ghysels and parametric tests for the period FY 1964 through FY
2003, we reject the null hypothesis of mean zero forecast errors at conventional significance levels.
This finding allows us to pursue far more interesting questions regarding the source of the bias.
Exploring such hypotheses, however, requires a parametric approach that is robust to short time
3Ehrbeck and Waldman (2001) provide a formal model that attempts to explain why professional forecasters with
incentives to be accurate would produce systematically biased forecasts. In their model, forecasters must balance
their aims of minimizing forecast errors and looking good before the outcome is observed by, for example, minimizing
forecast revisions. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt to model the ’government budget
forecasting game.’ However, Blackley and DeBoer (1993) oﬀer some thought provoking speculations in this regard.
This would be a fruitful topic for future research.
4Feenberg, Gentry, Gilroy, and Rosen (1989) and Gentry (1989) also use a regression based test to assess the
quality of state revenue forecasts. They report evidence of downward bias perhaps due to the statutory requirement
for the states in question to submit balanced budgets. However, their inferences also are based on asymptotic standard
errors that may not be valid given the short times series available for their analysis.
5Although intriguing, these studies are not entirely convincing for a variety of technical reasons. Auerbach (1999)
uses a regression based test of unbiasedness, but only 14 observations were available for analysis, which means that
the asymptotic standards errors on which his inferences are based may not be valid. Plesko (1988) uses a t-test to
evaluate the hypothesis of mean-zero forecasting errors or unbiasedness. For a t-test to be valid, however, the series
must consist of mutually stochastically independent random variables. This assumption is not satisfied in these data
because the actual and forecasted revenue series are serially correlated. Blackley and DeBoer (1993) use a regression
based test of unbiasedness, but their results are also suspect because of unaccounted for residual serial correlation
and a short time series casting doubt on inferences based on asymptotic standard errors. In contrast, Campbell and
Ghysels (1995) use nonparametric tests that are robust to short time series and serial correlation.
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series and accounts for residual serial correlation.
In this paper, we look for evidence of politically motivated bias in the OMB’s short-run revenue
forecasts of the sort described above. Specifically, using a regression based test of weak rationality
[Hansen (1980), Brown and Maital (1981), and Zarnowitz (1995), hereafter HBMZ], we evaluate
the OMB’s one-year ahead, proposed law, budget receipts forecasts for the period beginning in
FY1964 and ending in FY 2003. We employ the nonparametric Monte-Carlo bootstrap to avoid
appealing to asymptotic theory and model the serial correlation of the error structure to avoid
issues of parameter bias and ineﬃciency. Even after controlling for accidental forecasting errors
due to unanticipated economic and financial shocks, we still find evidence of systematically biased
revenue forecasts. Furthermore, the direction of the bias during successive administrations over the
past twenty-five years conforms to the policy goals of those administrations. These findings suggest
that recent administrations may have manipulated oﬃcial revenue forecasts to further their policy
objectives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe a regression
based test of forecast performance and the data used in this analysis. We discuss our empirical
findings in the third section. We conclude with a summary of our findings.
2 Model Structure and Data
Having established the importance of accurate, reliable, and trusted revenue forecasts, we need a
more precise though perhaps less prosaic formulation of forecast quality. One formulation that is
often used, especially in the theoretical literature, is full rationality. Full rationality implies that
all available information has been used in an optimal manner in producing the forecast. A related
concept is completeness which requires that all available information is actually used in producing
the forecast, though perhaps not in an optimal manner. Therefore, completeness is a necessary
condition for full rationality. It is often impossible to evaluate a forecast for completeness because
we usually do not have a full understanding of all relevant information available at the time the
forecast was constructed. HBMZ describe a simple regression based test of forecast quality that
does not require any knowledge of the available information set.
Following HBMZ, suppose the one-year ahead forecast of federal revenues, x(t), for fiscal
year t constructed at time t-1 is not complete. In other words, suppose x(t) is based on the
information set St−1, where St−1 is a proper subset of all relevant information (It−1) available
at time t-1, or St−1 ⊆ It−1. A forecast is weakly rational when predictions make optimal use
of St−1 or x(t) = E[y(t)|St−1].6 Now, let the dependence of x(t) on the information set used
to construct the predictions at time t-1 be represented as x(t) = Pt(St−1).7 The condition of
weak rationality implies x(t) = E[y(t)|x(t)]. If x(t) possesses this property, then x(t) is said
to be an unbiased estimate of y(t). Unbiasedness is thus a necessary condition for weak ra-
tionality. This leads to a test of weak rationality based on the following regression equation:
y(t) = b10 + b20x(t) + e(t). (1)
6Optimal, in the sense being used here, means that the forecast minimizes the mean squared error associated with
the forecast. See, for example, Hamilton (1994) for a proof that the conditional expectation E[y(t)|St−1] minimizes
the quadratic loss function as claimed.
7We assume the relation is time invariant, so the same mechanism is used each period to form predictions from
the subset of It.
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Under the null hypothesis of weak rationality, it is easily verified that E[e(t)|x(t)] = 0. This is the
key requirement for the ordinary least squares estimator of b10 = 0 and b20 = 1.0 to be consistent.
Thus, (1) provides a test of weak rationality whereby we reject the hypothesis of unbiasedness and
by implication weak rationality if regression analysis of (1) leads to rejection of the joint hypothesis
b10 = 0 and b20 = 1.0. However, OLS estimation of (1) may give inconsistent estimates of the
covariance matrix because the residuals e(t) may be serially correlated. The reason being that in
the present context y(t) is not known when OMB prepares its one-year ahead forecast of revenues;
hence the prior period forecast errors e(t-1) = y(t-1) - x(t-1) may not be known when x(t) is being
constructed.8 Since e(t-1) may not be part of the available information set at time t-1, we cannot
rule out the possibility that E[e(t)|e(t-1)] 6= 0 or that cov[e(t), e(t-1)] 6= 0. Thus, the estimation
procedure must allow for the possibility that the one-year ahead forecast errors are generated by
a lower order moving average process. Since the regressors in each case are not strictly exogenous,
generalized least squares (GLS) is likely to yield inconsistent coeﬃcient estimates. The reason
[see Hansen (1980) and Brown and Maital (1981)] is that in eﬀect GLS transforms the model to
eliminate the serial correlation in the residuals. But the transformed residuals for some particular
period are linear combinations of the original residuals with their lagged values. These in turn
are likely to be correlated with the transformed data for the same period because these include
current values of the variables in the information set. Since neither OLS or GLS is likely to be
valid, we propose using maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of (1) taking into account
the correlation structure of the error term.
Assume that the stochastic processes {y(t)} and {x(t)} are jointly stationary and ergodic, then
the residuals {e(t)}, as defined above, are covariance stationary. Based on the preceding discussion,
we can write
cov[e(t), e(t− s)] =
½
σ2θs, s = 0 or 1,
0, s > 1;
¾
. (2)
A covariance matrix consistent with (2) results when the residuals {e(t)} are generated by a first
order moving average process. Therefore, in the present context weak rationality and completeness
are fully consistent with
e(t) = ε(t) + ρ1ε(t− 1) (3)
where ε(t) is a white-noise error process, perhaps Gaussian. It follows that our empirical approach
is to reduce the unexplained error ε(t) to white noise and estimate the model using full information
maximum likelihood. The resulting estimates of the coeﬃcients are consistent and eﬃcient, and
our test statistics should be uniformly most powerful. To do so, we include variables that account
for accidental forecasting errors due to unexpected economic and financial shocks, innovations in
the budget process, and politically motivated forecasting errors.
8For example, the FY 2006 Budget of the United States Government was prepared in the first quarter of FY
2005, which runs from October 1 through December 31, 2004. Therefore, the forecasting errors for FY 2005 were
not available when the one-year ahead forecast (FY 2006) was being prepared. The point being that the current
period forecasting errors are not in the available information set of the one-year ahead forecast. This may result in
an MA(1) error structure, and the estimation procedure should allow for this.
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2.1 Source Data and Constructed Series
The OMB constructs two revenue forecasts, current law and proposed law revenues. We use the
one-year ahead, proposed law, revenue forecast series to make our results comparable to those of
previous studies. Further, the Congress generally accepts the administration’s aggregate, proposed
law, revenue targets, though they often modify the details of the administration’s tax proposals.
Therefore, we believe that the proposed law revenue forecast provides a superior prediction of ex-
pected revenue than the current law forecast. As previously discussed, the sample period begins in
FY 1964 and ends in FY 2003.9 While an uninterrupted series of actual and forecasted federal gov-
ernment revenues extends as far back as FY 1909, information regarding the economic assumptions
used to construct the revenue forecast are unavailable before FY 1964.10 The actual federal revenue
series comes from the historical tables of the FY 2004 Budget of the United States Government,
while the one-year ahead revenue predictions come from the respective FY Budgets.
We also construct an unexpected GDP series and an unexpected net long-term capital gains
realizations series because, as Parcell (1999) reports, unexpected growth in GDP and unusually
high capital gains realizations account in large part for the ’unexpected’ federal government revenue
surges in the mid-1990s. We define unexpected GDP in year t as UGDP(t) = AGDP(t) - PGDP(t),
where AGDP(t) is actual GDP in CY t and PGDP(t) is predicted value for year t constructed in
year t-1. Prior to FY 1993, we employ actual and unexpected GNP in the construction of this
series because that is the variable reported in the FY Budgets. Similarly, we define unexpected
net long-term capital gains realizations in year t as UCG(t) = ACG(t) - PCG(t), where ACG(t)
is actual net long-term capital gains realizations in year t and PCG(t) is the predicted value in
year t constructed in year t-1. Actual data for GNP, GDP, and the implicit GDP deflator are
for the calendar years corresponding to the fiscal year predictions. These data are available from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and net long-term capital gains realizations are available
from the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service. It is important to note that
the BEA frequently revises GDP (GNP) figures several years after the fact. This practice raises
the interesting question of whether to use preliminary or revised GDP (GNP) figures. While the
administration’s forecast of economic conditions, particularly GDP (GNP) and its components, is
by necessity based on preliminary figures for the most recent years, actual revenues in a given year
depend on the true state of the economy in that year. Consequently, we use the revised figures
of GDP (GNP) because these are presumably the best available measures of the true state of the
economy in any given year. The fact that the BEA revises GDP (GNP), even years after the
fact, means that errors in the GDP (GNP) series may not be known to the revenue forecaster for
several years into the future. This may be important for reasons discussed in greater detail below.
Finally, data on net long-term capital gains realizations are only available through CY 2003. All
series except the implicit GNP/GDP deflator and the capital gains series are expressed in billions
of nominal dollars. The base year of the implicit GNP/GDP deflator is CY 2000, and the capital
gains series is expressed in millions of nominal dollars.
Since the President’s FY Budget does not report the PCG(t) series used in the construction
9The start of the federal government’s fiscal year was moved 1 July to 1 October with the FY 1976 Budget, which
was released in Feburary 1975.
10As an interesting aside, the Treasury Department declined to provide a revenue forecast in the FY 1908 Budget
proclaiming the futility of the exercise due to the uncertainty surronding federal government revenues. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the only time since the federal government began issuing annual budgets in FY 1805 that
the budget has not provided a one-year ahead revenue forecast.
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of the OMB’s federal government revenue forecast, we use a methodology described in Miller and
Ozanne (2000) to construct such a series. Based on discussions with current and former members
of the Treasury Department’s revenue forecasting staﬀ, we believe that this methodology yields
consistent estimates of the predictions used to construct the OMB’s revenue forecasts. Before
describing the methodology, however, it is necessary to explain an adjustment that we made to the
actual capital gains realizations series. By way of background, there was a spike in capital gains
realizations in CY 1986 in response to the announced increase in the marginal tax rates on net
long-term capital gains realizations associated with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and taking aﬀect
in CY 1987. Since our methodology for constructing forecasted realizations is based on a ten-year
moving average of actual realizations, as explained in greater detail below, failing to adjust the
actual series for this one oﬀ event would distort our forecasted realizations series for the ten-year
period subsequent to CY 1986. We adjust the actual realizations series by first regressing realized
capital gains on a constant and a 0-1 dummy variable, equal to 1 in CY 1986 and zero otherwise.
The estimated coeﬃcient of the 1986 dummy variable accounts for the anticipatory behavior of
investors. We then multiply this estimated coeﬃcient by realized gains in CY 1986 to estimate
the absolute magnitude of the spike. Then we subtract our estimate of the spike from actual CY
1986 realizations to obtain an adjusted or smoothed realizations series. We use this adjusted series
to construct the UCG(t) series used in our analysis. Following Miller and Ozanne, we construct
a forecasted series of capital gains realizations by first computing the ten-year historical moving
average ratio of actual net long-term capital gains realizations and actual GDP for every year in
our sample, or
r(t) =
1
10
j=t−10X
j=t−1
CG(j)
GDP (j)
. (4)
Then, we compute PCG(t) as the product of r(t) and PGDP(t), where the predicted GDP series
is obtained from the corresponding FY Budgets. As before, we employ GNP prior to FY 1993.
For the reader’s convenience, we provide the source data and constructed series in Table 1. The
series used in our analysis are displayed in Figure 1. It is worth commenting on some of the more
salient features of the data that are evident in Figure 1. As previously remarked, OMB’s revenue
forecast generally lies above actual revenues in the 1980s, below actual revenues in the 1990s, and
above actual revenues in the early part of the 2000s. Further, the actual and forecasted revenue
series appear to be nonstationary. The bull markets in the latter part of the 1960s, mid-1980s,
and the latter part of the 1990s are evident in the graph of unexpected capital gains. Finally,
the unexpected GDP series is greater than zero in nearly every year in our sample, but there are
large downward spikes in this series in recession years, most notably FY 1982, FY 1991, and FY
2001.11 These downward spikes are dramatic illustrations of the failure of oﬃcial GDP forecasts to
account for economic recessions.12. As one would expect, the overly optimistic forecasts of GDP
in recession years is reflected in Figure 1 as upward spikes in forecasted revenues.
11Given the downward bias of projected GDP, one might expect that projected receipts, which are, in part, based
on projected GDP, would also exhibit downard bias. As projected receipts do not appear to exhibit such bias, an
unanswered question is how the apparent bias in projected GDP is adjusted by forecasters. We leave this question
to future research.
12The government’s economic forecast which drives the revenue forecast is produced by the Council of Economic
Advisors, Department of Treasury, and Oﬃce of Management and Budget or the troika in the parlance of Washington,
D.C. A number of studies have evaluated the quality of the troika’s economic forecasting record, including Kamlet,
Mowery, and Su (1987), Belongia (1988), Plesko (1988), and McNees (1995).
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Before turning to the discussion of our results, we briefly describe the estimation algorithm
used in our analysis. We employ a Box-Jenkins (1976) framework for our parametric examination
of the intertemporal correlation structure of e(t). We argue that the Box-Jenkins approach is most
appropriate for evaluating the hypotheses of interest because the transfer function form can acco-
modate exogenous explanatory variables as well as autoregressive moving average (ARMA) error
structures. For the parametric component of our study, we employ the Gaussian Maximum Like-
lihood (GML) estimator, seeking the parameter vector yielding a minimum of the negative of the
Gaussian log-likelihood function. Minimization of the negative log-likelihood is done iteratively by
the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFP) algorithm. Now, we proceed with a discussion of our empirical
investigation in the following section.13
3 Estimation Results
We begin by noting that the actual federal government revenue series, y(t) and the forecasted
revenue series, x(t) appear to be nonstationary (Figure 1). The OMB forecast errors also appear to
exhibit serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and bias over short intervals (Figure 2). While these
observations are certainly suggestive, we submit them to rigorous tests below.
3.1 Model 0
We proceed by evaluating the weak rationality of the revenue forecast series using the Brown-
Maital-Zarnowitz regression based test. We begin by estimating a restricted regression that only
incorporates a constant term or
y(t) = b10 + x(t) + ε(t). (5)
Consistent with the null hypothesis of unbiasedness, we explicitly assume that the slope coeﬃcient
is equal to 1.0. If the null hypothesis is true, imposing this restriction increases the eﬃciency of
the test. As reported in Table 2, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated intercept
is equal to zero at conventional significance levels. This finding is consistent with those of previous
studies that find no evidence of bias in the OMB’s one-year ahead, revenue forecasts. As expected
from the preceding discussion, the residual autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions
suggest the presence of an MA(1) process, suggesting that a more appropriate form of the model is
e(t) = y(t)− x(t) = b10 + [1 + θ1L]ε(t). (6)
Campbell and Ghysels (1995) suggest using nonparametric statistics to investigate the relationship
between x(t) and y(t).They contend that short data series make suspect any approach like Box-
Jenkins that is based on asymptotic arguments. Further, they argue that heteroskedasticity, which
one may infer from Figures 1 and 2, and a lack of compelling reasons to support distributional
assumptions are additional factors favoring a nonparametric approach. Therefore, we use the
nonparametric tests to evaluate each model. Table 3 presents the probability values for the sign
and signed rank tests for each of the first three models. Regarding the present case, we find
13DFP is a quasi-Newton method using a numerical approximation to the inverse Hessian of the negative log-
likelihood function, updated at each iteration. It exhibits quadratic convergence near a local minimum. All gradient
information is generated numerically. We employ this approach to treat linear and nonlinear parameterizations with
equal ease. See, for example, Hamilton (1994) for a more detailed discussion of the DFP algorithm, and Shanno
(1970) for further details on the BFGS method.
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that these tests corroborate the information conveyed by our residual diagnostics, i.e., the residual
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions.14 These tests indicate nonzero correlation
for lag-1 with the signed rank test providing the more forceful message. There is also evidence of
a statistically significant lag-6 correlation. We set this finding aside for the time being, however,
as there appears to be little reason to include such a long lag correlation in our modeling eﬀort at
this stage of the investigation.
It is worth noting that we have almost twice the number of observations as Campbell and
Ghysels; we work in levels rather than growth rates; and we make no distributional assumptions.
Regarding the latter point, we use GML estimation and take comfort in its desirable properties
in many non-Gaussian environments.15 Finally, we do not rely on asymptotic arguments for our
hypothesis testing because we conduct our tests using a nonparametric bootstrap, as discussed in
greater detail below.
3.2 Model 1
The next model removes the restriction b20 = 1.0 to see if this accounts for the suggested MA(1)
error process. We thus estimate the following simple OLS model:
y(t) = b10 + b20x(t) + ε(t). (7)
Again, the results given in Table 2 appear to justify the assertion that OMB forecasts are unbiased.
The intercept is not statistically significantly diﬀerent than zero at conventional levels, and the slope
coeﬃcient is not statistically significantly diﬀerent than unity at conventional levels, at least insofar
as inferences based on asymptotic standard errors are valid. However, our residual diagnostics and
the nonparametric tests reported in Table 3 reveal the presence of significant residual correlation
consistent with an MA(1) error process. Thus, this OLS model is not valid and, therefore, is not
a reliable framework within which to conduct hypothesis tests. In fact, little has changed relative
to our previous eﬀort. Relaxing the restriction on the slope coeﬃcient does nothing to remove
the residual correlation: an MA(1) error structure appears necessary. As previously discussed,
knowledge of e(t-1) is not available when x(t) is being constructed. Consequently, an MA(1) error
structure is not inconsistent with completeness or full rationality of the forecast, much less weak
rationality.
3.3 Model 2
Model 2 elaborates on Model 1 by adding an MA(1) error to the OLS specification:
y(t) = b10 + b20x(t) + [1 + θ1L]ε(t). (8)
The model parameter estimates given in Table 2 continue to indicate no statistically significant
intercept and a slope coeﬃcient that is not significantly diﬀerent from unity, both at conventional
significance levels. However, the story regarding the residuals has changed. The estimate of θ1 is
more than seven times its asymptotic standard error, and our residual diagnostics indicate that
14Due to space considerations, we do not present the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions. These
are available upon request from the authors.
15See, for example, Hamilton (1994) for a guide to the literature and a discussion of the properties of GML
estimation when the density is misspecified.
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we have eliminated all serial correlation. Furthermore, the nonparametric tests of Table 3 provide
further corroboration of this conclusion. Except at lag-8 the message is the same. As before, we
find little to justify attempting to fit such a long lag term, but we keep this finding in mind for
subsequent evaluation.
3.4 Model 3
Figure 3 provides line graphs of the residuals of the various specifications estimated thusfar. As
evidenced in Figure 3, there are several salient features of the residuals from Model 2 that require
our attention. There are relatively large negative residuals in FY 1982, FY 1990, FY 1991, and
FY 2000-2002. All these years correspond to recessions. Furthermore, there are persistent positive
residuals from FY 1995 through FY 2000. These years correspond to the boom in the equity
markets. Both the positive and negative residuals in these years can be attributed to unexpected
economic and financial shocks; phenomena that are impossible for the OMB to predict. To the
extent that these unforeseen events contribute to the model residuals, they should be taken into
account in our modeling eﬀort. Therefore we expand the MA(1) model to include UGDP (t) and
UCG(t):
y(t) = b10 + b20x(t) + b30UGDP (t) + b40UCG(t) + [1 + θ1L]ε(t). (9)
The estimates of Model 3, which are reported in Table 2, indicate that both additional explanatory
variables are statistically significant at conventional levels, and the residual variance decreases by
more than 40 percent. Also, the intercept is now statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero at con-
ventional levels, but the slope coeﬃcient remains indistinguishable from unity also at conventional
levels. The MA(1) coeﬃcient is now only marginally significant at conventional levels. The residual
correlation structure indicates that there may be statistically significant serial correlation at lag-3,
however, the nonparametric correlation tests indicate that this is not significant at conventional
levels. Clearly, the addition of the unexpected eﬀects has altered the situation. This suggests that
omitted variables may completely explain the remaining residual serial correlation. It is possible
that Model 3 is, in reality, a model still subject to omitted variable problems where the variables
omitted represent the political goals of each administration. Thus we turn to an investigation of
the potential influence of strategic political considerations on the construction of OMB revenue
forecasts.
3.5 Presidential Administration Eﬀects
Figure 3 provides a useful perspective on our modeling eﬀorts thus far. The journey from Model
1 through Model 3 shows progressive improvement in the residuals with each elaboration of the
model. At each stage we introduce variables that account for certain behavior in the residuals. The
residuals of Model 3 are no less informative. As evident in Figure 3, there is a sustained series of
negative residuals from FY 1981 through FY 1986 and a sustained series of positive residuals from
FY 1995 through FY 1998. This brings to mind the previous discussion about an administration
using deliberate forecasting errors to garner support for their policy goals. More specifically, the
sustained negative series of residuals clearly result from x(t) values that are too large or an overly
optimistic forecast. Similarly, the sustained series of positive residuals result from x(t) values that
are too small or an overly pessimistic forecast. The timing of both sequences of residuals brings to
mind the Reagan and Clinton administrations. An eﬀort to justify increases in defense spending and
tax reductions could have been well served by overly optimistic revenue predictions, and eﬀorts to
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rein-in government spending could have been well served by overly pessimistic revenue projections.
Model 3 is complete enough to serve as the basis for testing of these hypotheses.
To test for such influences, we construct a set of 0 - 100 dummy variables for each administration
over the sample period. For example, we represent the Reagan presidency by a series with zero
values from FY 1963 through FY 1981, then with ones from FY 1982 through FY 1989, and zeros
again from FY 1990 through FY 2003. Table 4 presents the estimation of Model 2 with these
’presidential dummy variables’ as each is inserted in the model as z5(t). To save space, we use the
following abbreviations: Ke = Kennedy, Jo = Johnson, Ni = Nixon/Ford, Ca = Carter, Re =
Reagan, B1 = Bush I, Cl = Clinton, and B2 = Bush II to identify the diﬀerent models in Table 4.
The b50 estimates reported in Table 4 indicate that the Clinton and Bush II administrations have
the greatest impact. The Reagan administration appears to have a much weaker eﬀect. While weak,
this eﬀect has a sign consistent with a desire to overstate revenues for the purposes of creating the
appearance of greater fiscal space for a defense build-up and tax cuts than subsequent facts would
show to be the case. The Reagan administration eﬀect may be diluted by the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act which went into eﬀect in FY 1986. The UGDP and UCG eﬀects are present in all
cases, and their coeﬃcients are relatively stable except in the Clinton and Bush II administrations.
The MA(1) error is not as well defined in all but the Bush II administration. It appears that
there are presidential administration eﬀects which may aﬀect the serial correlation structure of the
residuals. Taken together, these findings suggest that the Reagan, Clinton, and Bush II eﬀects
should be included in the model. Furthermore, the Reagan eﬀect requires inclusion of a dummy
variable representing the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act.
3.6 Model 4
To pursue the issues raised above, we re-estimate Model 3 and include three presidential eﬀects:
Reagan, Clinton, and Bush II. We also introduce a 0-100 dummy variable representing the GRH
Act. This dummy variable is zero for all years except FY 1986 where it takes on the value 100.
GRH was in eﬀect for only one fiscal year before it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. It was amended in 1987 and no longer had the original eﬀect or potency.
Model estimation with the expanded set of explanatory variables is summarized in Tables 5,
6, and 7. The weakness of the MA(1) residual structure with presidential administration eﬀects is
tested by re-estimating the model assuming an OLS specification. The residual autocorrelations
and partial autocorrelations show large values at lag-2 and lag-6 but little correlation at lag-1.
These conclusions are further corroborated by the nonparametric test results reported in Table
6. Estimation of the MA(1) specification reinforces these findings: θ1 is not statistically signifi-
cant at conventional levels (Table 5) and the nonparametric tests indicate lag-5 or lag-6 residual
correlations (Table 6). These findings lead us to re-estimate the model with a restricted MA(6)
specification in which θ2 and θ6 are nonzero. The model with moving-average lag-2 and lag-6 terms
is selected as our baseline model which we henceforth refer to as Model 4. Model 4 is used to
conduct hypothesis tests.
The estimated parameters and the p-values of the nonparametric tests of Model 4 are reported
in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Model 4 has a stronger Reagan eﬀect than before, and the GRH
dummy appears well defined. The traditional asymptotic statistics suggest Reagan, Clinton, and
GRH are statistically significant at conventional levels, while Bush II is only marginally significant
at conventional levels. Line graphs of the residual series for all three versions of Model 4 are
provided in Figure 3.
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This model controls for unexpected economic and financial shocks, strategic political eﬀects,
GRH eﬀect, and residual serial correlation. Until now traditional asymptotic standard errors have
been used to draw inferences from the sample, but this approach is suspect given that only 40
observations are being used to estimate up to 11 parameters (10 coeﬃcients and σ2ε). By way of
explanation for this approach, recall that our modeling eﬀort up to now has been focused on reducing
the residuals to white noise, and all inferences regarding statistical properties of the residuals have
been corroborated by nonparametric tests that are robust to short time series and other violations
of the asymptotic theory. Clearly, however, we are at the limits of the applicability of asymptotic
theory and relying only on this theory is tenuous at best. Thus we now turn to an investigation of
statistical significance based on the nonparametric bootstrap. The residuals of Model 4 comprise a
sequence for which we cannot reject serial interrelatedness or exchangeability, two key requirements
of the bootstrap we use for hypothesis testing.
4 Bootstrap Analysis
The bootstrap is a resampling technique developed by Bradely Efron (1979, 1982) that is valuable
in assessing the sampling distribution of an estimator when data series are ’short’ and reliance on
asymptotic theory is suspect. This is important in the present context because our series consists
of only 40 observations.
4.1 Bootstrap Confidence Intervals
The bootstrap is most valuable because of the distributional information it provides. This allows
us to construct confidence levels and conduct hypothesis tests without resorting to asymptotic
theory. 5,000 realizations of the estimated parameter vector λ∗(b) permit the construction of reliable
estimates of the sampling distribution and the relative frequency histograms for the parameter
estimates. Both GML estimation and the bootstrap indicate strong correlation between b10 and
b20.Our GML estimation gives a correlation of −0.833, and the bootstrap estimate is −0.825. High
correlation between b10 and b20 requires a joint approach to hypothesis testing which we take up
in due course. First, however, we consider confidence intervals based on the marginal distribution
information reported in Table 8. Confidence intervals can be established easily from the marginal
distributions using the bootstrap percentile method. At the usual 95 percent confidence level we
find b10 insignificant, but we must reject b20 = 1.0 at this confidence level. All other parameters are
significant at the 95 percent level. The evidence of estimated parameter bias reported in Table 7,
however, requires that we consider Efron’s “Bias Corrected” (BC) or “Bias Corrected Accelerated”
(BCa) methods. These results are summarized in Table 9, where we give the traditional central
90 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals. Based on the confidence intervals reported in
Table 7, we find little evidence to reject b10 = 0 at conventional significance levels, but we do
find evidence against b20 = 1.0 at conventional significance levels. The political eﬀects are all
statistically significant at conventional levels. The estimated eﬀects of Reagan and Bush II dummy
variables are negative, while the eﬀect of the Clinton dummy variable is positive. The respective
signs of the three administration eﬀects conform to the policy aims of these administrations, as
discussed above. All results so far derive from consideration of only marginal distributions and
ignore correlation among the parameters. Since both the GML estimation and the bootstrap show
the coeﬃcients to be correlated, a joint test is more appropriate — a point to which we turn to now.
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4.2 Joint Hypothesis Testing
The strong correlation between b10 and other parameters, most notably b20, requires testing joint
hypotheses. The bootstrap distribution of λ∗(b)− bλ is an estimate of the sampling distribution ofbλ−λ; where bλ is our sample parameter estimate, thus the joint behavior is already available for our
use. Figure 3 shows the joint sampling distribution of b10 and b20 from the bootstrap. Note that
only the first 1,500 bootstrap values are plotted because the entire 5,000 point postscript file is too
large to load into this document; the picture with all 5,000 points is even more dramatic. The null
hypothesis H0: {b10 = 0, b20 = 1.0} is indicated by the crosshairs in this figure and corresponds to a
point so far removed from the scatter of points that a probability value of zero appears appropriate.
This picture illustrates how important information is concerning the correlation between parameter
estimates. To evaluate model 4, however, the testing framework must be more than bivariate and
go beyond the capabilities of a two-dimensional scatter diagram.
Testing in this situation requires a multivariate framework that allows us to employ traditional
probability value computations after we have taken account of the multivariate correlations. This is
done by transforming the data using a Cholesky factorization [see, for example, Hamilton (1994)] to
diagonalize the parameter variance-covariance matrix (see Appendix 3 for details). The magnitudes
of the elements of the resulting vector provide strong evidence for rejecting the joint hypothesis
b10 = 0, b20 = 1.0, and Reagan = Clinton = Bush II = 0. The joint test and the estimates reported
in Table 9 suggest that b10 > 0 and b20 < 1.0. This has the following interpretation: forecasters
tended to overestimate the underlying trend by some constant amount. For percentage changes
that exceed (fall short of) the trend, predictions thus overstated (understated) the actual increase.
Hence, predicted changes were more volatile around the trend than actual changes. The estimated
eﬀects of the Reagan and Bush II dummy variables are negative which is consistent with the
notion that the revenue forecasts were deliberately biased upward to garner support for increases
in defense expenditures and tax cuts by suggesting that there is greater fiscal space for such actions
than optimal use of all available information might otherwise support. A positive Clinton eﬀect
suggests that pessimistic revenue forecasts would further the policy objective of deficit reduction
by suggesting that there was less fiscal space than an optimal use of all available information would
support. Systematic bias could emerge for technical problems in forecasting, such as erroneously
specified models, but it should not vary with the administration in power. That the algebraic
signs of the administration eﬀects conform with the policy aims of successive administrations, even
after controlling for unexpected economic and financial shocks, provides evidence in support of
the hypothesis that revenue forecasts were deliberately biased for strategic reasons during the past
twenty-five years.
As previously noted, the GRH Act provided for automatic spending cuts, if the president and
Congress failed to reach specified targets according to the OMB’s budget forecasts. A positive GRH
eﬀect suggests an administration seeking to reduce the chances that the president and Congress
would not achieve the targets triggering automatic expenditure cuts. As many have pointed out,
ex ante deficit rules, like the GRH Act and for that matter some balanced-budget rules, are not a
substitute for a political commitment to fiscal discipline. Rather, such rules may simply give rise to
budget gimmicks like inflated revenue forecasts to give the appearance of fiscal restraint. Finally,
the estimated coeﬃcients of the lag terms are negative and rather small. It is diﬃcult to attach
special meaning to these particular lags, except to note that information about forecasting errors
2 and 6 years in the past are available at the time that the forecast is constructed. As previously
noted, however, the BEA may revise GDP (GNP) figures several years after the fact, and perhaps
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the indicated lag structure is an artifact of such revisions.
5 Summary
Since any pattern of forecast errors could simply reflect accidental forecasting errors, it is diﬃcult
to provide convincing evidence of deliberate and politically motivated bias in the OMB’s short-
run revenue forecasts. In contrast to previous studies, we find strong evidence for rejecting the
hypothesis of unbiasedness and thus weak rationality of the OMB’s short-run revenue forecasts.
A nonparametric bootstrap approach to evaluate the joint significance of the parameter estimates
soundly rejects the hypothesis of unbiasedness or b0 = 0 and b1 = 1.0 and, consequently, weak
rationality. Even when we obtain optimal least-squares estimates of b0 and b1, the basic model,
e(t) = y(t) − b0 − b1x(t), is not supported by the data. We continue to find evidence of serial
correlation in our model even after we have controlled for unexpected economic and financial
shocks, the GRH Act, and administration eﬀects. This serial correlation is evident in both a
parametric, Box-Jenkins approach, and nonparametric Campbell-Ghysels approach. The form of
the serial correlation is important because information about forecast errors at lag 2 and lag 6 is
available at the time the forecast is constructed. Thus, the evidence of MA(2) and MA(6) error
processes in our baseline model are not consistent with completeness. In other words, there is
information in the forecast errors that could be used to improve the forecast. The elaborations on
the model that include variables representing unexpected events have an eﬀect on the form of the
serial correlation in the residuals but does not serve to eliminate it. Though it may come as little or
no surprise to some, we find evidence of administration eﬀects in the OMB’s revenue forecasts, even
after controlling for unexpected economic and financial shocks. The direction of the administration
eﬀects conform to the policy aims of successive administrations over the past twenty-five years.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that the OMB’s short-run revenue forecasts are deliberately
biased to further the policy aims of an administration. Based on this evidence, formal modeling of
the dynamics of the budgeting process may be an interesting and fruitful area for future research.
To the extent that the current budget process has an inherent bias favoring deficit spending or
growth in the size of government, as some contend, then formal modeling and further empirical
research may suggest reforms of the budget process that would foster greater fiscal discipline.
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7 Appendix 1: Tables
Table 1
Source Data and Constructed Series
GNP GDP CG GDP Deflator GNP GDP CG U-GNP U-GDP U-CG
1964 112.6 112.2 622.2 617.7 17,431 22.1 578 13091.7 44.2 4,339
1965 116.8 119.7 668.5 663.6 21,484 22.5 623 14312.0 45.5 7,172
1966 130.8 123.5 724.4 719.1 21,348 23.2 660 15537.5 64.4 5,811
1967 148.8 145.5 792.9 787.8 27,535 23.9 722 17674.6 70.9 9,860
1968 153.0 168.1 838.0 832.6 35,607 24.9 787 20477.7 51.0 15,129
1969 186.9 178.1 916.1 910.0 31,439 26.2 846 23611.9 70.1 7,827
1970 192.8 198.7 990.7 984.6 20,848 27.5 921 26257.7 69.7 -5,410
1971 187.1 202.1 1,044.9 1,038.5 28,341 28.9 985 27865.7 59.9 475
1972 207.3 217.5 1,134.7 1,127.1 35,869 30.2 1,065 29681.6 69.7 6,187
1973 230.8 220.8 1,246.8 1,238.3 35,757 31.9 1,145 32598.2 101.8 3,159
1974 263.2 256.0 1,395.3 1,382.7 30,217 34.7 1,267 36350.2 128.3 -6,133
1975 279.1 295.0 1,515.5 1,500.0 30,903 38.0 1,390 39031.2 125.5 -8,128
1976 298.1 297.5 1,651.3 1,638.3 39,492 40.2 1,498 40431.0 153.3 -939.02
1977 355.6 351.3 2,051.2 2,030.9 45,338 42.8 1,890 50009.4 161.2 -4,671
1978 399.6 393.0 2,316.3 2,294.7 50,526 45.8 2,092 53115.9 224.3 -2,590
1979 463.3 439.6 2,595.3 2,563.3 73,443 49.6 2,335 55292.8 260.3 18,150
1980 517.1 502.6 2,823.7 2,789.5 74,132 54.1 2,565 59892.8 258.7 14,239
1981 599.3 600.0 3,161.4 3,128.4 80,938 59.1 2,842 68179.6 319.4 12,758
1982 617.8 711.8 3,291.5 3,255.0 90,153 62.7 3,312 79686.7 -20.5 10,466
1983 600.6 666.1 3,573.8 3,536.7 122,773 65.2 3,524 84364.6 49.8 38,408
1984 666.5 659.7 3,969.5 3,933.2 140,500 67.7 3,566 88543.8 403.5 51,956
1985 734.1 745.1 4,246.8 4,220.3 171,985 69.7 3,974 104873.9 272.8 67,111
1986 769.2 793.7 4,480.6 4,462.8 143,431 71.3 4,285 122465.3 195.6 20,965
1987 854.4 850.4 4,757.4 4,739.5 148,449 73.2 4,629 135451.3 128.4 12,998
1988 909.3 916.6 5,127.4 5,103.8 162,592 75.7 4,816 145257.5 311.4 17,334
1989 991.2 964.7 5,510.6 5,484.4 154,040 78.6 5,113 159226.2 397.6 -5,186
1990 1,032.0 1,059.3 5,837.9 5,803.1 123,783 81.6 5,570 173179.4 267.9 -49,396
1991 1,055.0 1,170.2 6,026.3 5,995.9 111,592 84.5 6,002 183489.8 24.3 -71,898
1992 1,091.3 1,165.0 6,367.4 6,337.7 126,692 86.4 6,095 181944.6 272.4 -55,253
1993 1,154.4 1,169.1 6,689.3 6,657.4 152,259 88.4 6,319 6,307 183416.7 370.3 350 -31,158
1994 1,258.6 1,251.3 7,098.4 7,072.2 152,727 90.3 6,594 183982.2 478 -31,255
1995 1,351.8 1,353.8 7,433.4 7,397.7 180,130 92.1 7,118 188637.3 280 -8,507
1996 1,453.1 1,415.5 7,851.9 7,816.9 260,696 93.9 7,507 186559.8 310 74,136
1997 1,579.3 1,495.2 8,337.3 8,304.3 364,829 95.4 8,008 202922.7 296 161,906
1998 1,721.8 1,566.8 8,768.3 8,747.0 455,223 96.5 8,313 221125.8 434 234,097
1999 1,827.5 1,742.7 9,302.2 9,268.4 552,608 97.9 8,772 250879.2 496 301,729
2000 2,025.2 1,883.0 9,855.9 9,817.0 644,285 100.0 9,199 292068.3 618 352,217
2001 1,991.2 2,019.0 10,171.6 10,128.0 349,441 102.4 10,156 367444.1 -28 -18,003
2002 1,853.2 2,191.7 10,514.1 10,487.0 268,615 104.1 11,004 415621.1 -517 -147,006
2003 1,798.3 2,048.1 11,059.2 11,004.0 288,630 106.0 11,073 424428.1 -69 -135,798
Economic Assumptions
Actual (CY) UnexpectedForecast (CY)Fiscal 
Year
Receipts
Actual Forecast
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Table 2
Parameter Estimation Results
(standard errors are reported in parentheses)
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept -14.7 27.4 51.5 -67.3
(13.8) (36.4) (50.0) (28.2)
OMB Forecast 1.0 0.962 0.941 0.975
(0.030) (0.041) (0.020)
Unexpected GDP – – – 0.233
(0.038)
Unexpected CG – – – 0.0366
(0.093)
θ1 – – 0.771 0.368
(0.095) (0.212)
σε 87.1 84.5 64.1 36.3
(9.2) (7.4) (4.1)
c(λ) 235.4 234.2 223.2 200.4
Table 3
Nonparametric Residual Correlation Tests
(p-values for the sign and signed rank tests)
Lag length Test Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
1-period Signed 0.06 0.11 1.00 1.00
Signed Rank 0.03 0.04 0.88 0.79
2-periods Signed 0.87 0.87 0.63 0.87
Signed Rank 0.90 0.75 0.42 0.79
3-periods Signed 1.00 1.00 0.51 0.19
Signed Rank 0.83 0.94 0.99 0.14
4-periods Signed 0.41 0.87 0.87 0.87
Signed Rank 0.41 0.77 0.63 0.71
5-periods Signed 0.18 0.74 1.00 0.74
Signed Rank 0.17 0.40 0.84 0.22
6-periods Signed 0.03 0.61 0.39 0.23
Signed Rank 0.04 0.23 0.16 0.26
7-periods Signed 1.00 0.61 0.39 0.30
Signed Rank 0.48 0.23 0.16 0.93
8-periods Signed 0.86 0.86 0.05 0.38
Signed Rank 0.50 0.45 0.08 0.39
17
Table 4
Parameter Estimates with Presidential Administration Eﬀect
(standard errors are reported in parentheses)
Variable Ke Jo Ni Ca Re B1 Cl B2
Intercept -68.2 -87.8 -70.5 -68.3 -61.1 -68.1 -20.0 -79.7
(28.7) (35.8) (33.2) (28.6) (27.1) (29.8) (23.8) (26.0)
OMB Forecast 0.976 0.987 0.977 0.975 0.975 0.976 0.926 1.006
(0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020)
Unexpected GDP 0.234 0.246 0.234 0.244 0.229 0.235 0.209 0.190
(0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.033) (0.036)
Unexpected CG -0.365 0.340 0.368 0.354 0.391 0.358 0.246 0.295
(0.097) (0.102) (0.095) (0.094) (0.091) (0.100) (0.077) (0.089)
Kennedy Dummy -0.276 - - - - - - -
(1.489) - - - - - - -
Johnson Dummy - 0.235 - - - - - -
- (0.255) - - - - - -
Nixon Dummy - - 0.044 - - - - -
- - (0.235) - - - - -
Carter Dummy - - - -0.172 - - - -
- - - (0.283) - - - -
Reagan Dummy - - - - -0.253 - - -
- - - - (0.183) - - -
H. Bush Dummy - - - - - -0.065 - -
- - - - - (0.265) - -
Clinton Dummy - - - - - - 0.906 -
- - - - - - (0.212) -
W. Bush Dummy - - - - - - - -1.308
- - - - - - - (0.394)
θ1 0.367 0.379 0.356 0.355 0.239 0.369 0.161 0.444
(0.207) (0.221) (0.210) (0.197) (0.266) (0.207) (0.200) (0.153)
σε 36.2 35.9 34.3 36.1 35.4 36.2 30.2 31.7
(4.2) (4.3) (3.9) (4.0) (4.3) (4.4) (3.5) (3.6)
c(λ) 200.4 199.9 200.4 200.2 199.5 200.4 193.0 195.1
18
Table 5
Parameter Estimates with Combined Set of Explanatory Variables
(standard errors are reported in parentheses)
Variable OLS MA(1) MA(6)
Intercept -34.6 -41.2 15.3
(19.1) (24.2) (8.5)
OMB Forecast 0.953 0.960 0.923
(0.020) (0.025) (0.015)
Unexpected GDP 0.195 0.196 0.134
(0.030) (0.031) (0.026)
Unexpected CG 0.263 0.247 0.293
(0.061) (0.073) (0.062)
Reagan Dummy -0.244 -0.233 -0.280
(0.128) (0.151) (0.123)
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Dummy 0.801 0.727 0.912
(0.285) (0.282) (0.280)
Clinton Dummy 0.646 0.605 0.878
(0.217) (0.252) (0.196)
W. Bush Dummy -0.611 -0.754 -0.610
(0.368) (0.398) (0.344)
σε 26.7 26.3 23.9
(3.1) (3.0) (2.7)
θ1 – 0.232 –
(0.256)
θ2 – – -0.282
(0.107)
θ6 – – -0.409
(0.102)
c(λ) 188.1 187.6 183.6
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Table 6
Nonparametric Residual Correlation Tests
(p-values for sign and singed rank tests)
Lag length Test OLS MA(1) MA(6)
1-period Signed 0.75 0.75 0.20
Signed Rank 0.52 0.91 0.58
2-periods Signed 0.04 0.63 0.87
Signed Rank 0.03 0.32 0.34
3-periods Signed 0.51 0.74 0.74
Signed Rank 0.50 0.53 0.73
4-periods Signed 0.41 0.41 0.87
Signed Rank 0.61 0.87 0.89
5-periods Signed 0.31 0.90 0.74
Signed Rank 0.11 0.10 0.95
6-periods Signed 0.23 0.23 0.61
Signed Rank 0.03 0.01 0.61
7-periods Signed 0.73 1.00 1.00
Signed Rank 0.87 0.92 0.49
8-periods Signed 0.86 0.60 0.86
Signed Rank 0.86 0.99 0.65
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Table 7
Bootstrap and ML Estimates of Model 4
(standard errors are reported in parentheses)
Variable MLE Bootstrap (λ
∗
) dbiasB
Intercept 15.3 23.8 8.5
(8.5) (18.7)
OMB Forecast 0.923 0.916 -0.006
(0.015) (0.019)
Unexpected GDP 0.134 0.129 -0.006
(0.026) (0.030)
Unexpected CG 0.293 0.297 0.004
(0.062) (0.060)
Reagan Dummy -0.280 -0.273 0.007
(0.123) (0.117)
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Dummy 0.912 0.879 -0.033
(0.280) (0.251)
Clinton Dummy 0.878 0.921 0.043
(0.196) (0.212)
W. Bush Dummy -0.610 -0.582 0.028
(0.344) (0.335)
θ2 -0.282 -0.397 -0.115
(0.107) (0.176)
θ6 -0.409 -0.458 -0.049
(0.102) (0.137)
σ 23.9 20.0 -3.8
(2.7) (2.5)
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TABLE 8
Bootstrap Quantiles for Model 4
Percentile b0 b1 θ1 θ2 σ2ε c03 c04 Re GRH Cl B2
0.010 −18.5 0.871 −0.822 −0.773 14.4 0.059 0.156 −0.55 0.33 0.42 −1.34
0.020 −13.2 0.877 −0.772 −0.737 15.0 0.067 0.173 −0.51 0.38 0.48 −1.26
0.025 −11.3 0.879 −0.754 −0.726 15.3 0.069 0.178 −0.50 0.41 0.50 −1.23
0.050 −6.2 0.885 −0.687 −0.680 16.0 0.079 0.198 −0.47 0.48 0.56 −1.13
0.500 23.6 0.916 −0.392 −0.461 20.0 0.129 0.297 −0.27 0.87 0.92 −0.58
0.950 55.5 0.947 −0.113 −0.234 24.1 0.176 0.397 −0.08 1.30 1.26 −0.03
0.975 63.4 0.952 −0.058 −0.182 24.9 0.184 0.414 −0.04 1.38 1.33 0.06
0.980 65.6 0.954 −0.044 −0.161 25.5 0.185 0.419 −0.03 1.41 1.35 0.09
0.990 71.5 0.960 0.007 −0.125 25.7 0.195 0.435 0.01 1.47 1.41 0.18
TABLE 9
Bootstrap BCa Confidence Intervals for Model 4
Variable 90 percent 95 percent
Intercept [-17.700, 38.800] [-21.3, 46.400]
OMB Forecast [0.869, 0.933] [0.863, 0.938]
Unexpected GDP [0.061, 0.163] [0.049, 0.170]
Unexpected CG [0.181, 0.383] [0.158, 0.400]
Reagan Dummy [-0.487, -0.101] [-0.526, -0.066]
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Dummy [0.444, 1.261] [0.383, 1.352]
Clinton Dummy [0.500, 1.199] [0.435, 1.263]
W. Bush Dummy [-1.221, -0.111] [-1.324, -0.017]
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8 Appendix 2: Figures
Figure 1: Time Series Data
23
Figure 2: OMB Forecast Error
24
Figure 3: Estimated Model Residuals
25
Figure 4: Bootstrap Scatter Plot for b1 (vertical axis) vs. b0 (horizontal axis)
26
9 Appendix 3: Joint Hypothesis Test
Following Theil(1971), we calculate P such that. C−1= P0P, where C is the parameter variance-
covariance matrix. Next, we transform the data to z∗(b) = P[λ∗(b) − λ∗], and we transform the
null hypothesis to z0 = P[λ0 − λ∗]. This amounts to a multivariate standardization of λ∗(b). We
now have a spherical distribution with unit variance and zero mean. Hypothesis testing now asks
how likely is an observation within a specified radial distance from the origin. The original joint
hypothesis test is transformed into a test of how likely is
°°z0°° given our observations, z∗(b). The
Kolmolgorov-Smirnov goodness of fit test on each element of λ∗(b) indicates only b10 is not Gaussian
distributed. We thus can conduct significance tests using the standard Gaussian distribution for
all elements of z. The transformed null hypothesis vector, corresponding to b10 = 0, b20 = 1.0, and
Re = GRH = Cl = B2 = 0 is
z0 = [9.27 2.99 −14.22 −9.09 4.52 −3.42 −5.88 1.74]0.
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